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ABSTRACT 
The  time  profile  of  inflation  in  China  resembles  the  one  experienced  in  major 
industrial countries. Given the uncertainty surrounding the sources of economic shocks, this 
paper compares results from three sets of alternative identification conditions, namely the 
standard Blanchard-Quah approach, the approach of Cover, Enders, and Hueng (2006), as 
well  as  the  model  considered  by  Bordo,  Landon-Lane  and  Redish  (2004).  Our  principal 
finding is that inflation in China has been primarily driven by monetary factors. While aggregate 
supply factors may have pushed inflation to cross the threshold leading to deflation, monetary 
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1. Introduction  
  The  time  profile  of  inflation  in  China  over  the  past  15  years  resembles  the  one 
experienced in major industrial countries over a 40-year period. Figure 1 makes the point 
graphically by comparing the US inflation experience over the past 40 years against China’s 
inflation since 1990. Negative aggregate supply shocks during the 1970s, combined with an 
inappropriate monetary policy response, are believed to explain the spike in inflation in the 
early 1980s in the US. In contrast, the low and stable inflation rates since the 1990s in the 
U.S.  are  the  product  of  the  emphasis  on  price  stability,  combined  with  good  aggregate 
demand management (e.g., see Orphanides 2003). In China, the deregulation of prices in the 
early  1990s  may  well  have  contributed  to  the  rapid  rise  of  inflation  together  with  an 
accommodative monetary policy. Some observers (e.g., Bernanke 2002, Cargill and Parker 
2004) claim that the deflation in China, in particular, may have been driven primarily by 
aggregate supply factors, especially strong productivity growth. Others (e.g., Burdekin and 
Siklos 2007) are more skeptical. There is a subtle difference of opinion about whether the 
deflation in China was primarily driven by aggregate demand (AD) or supply (AS) factors.  
Figure 1 about here 
  Whether inflation in China is explained by aggregate demand or supply factors have 
important  broader  implications  for  our  understanding  of  the  role  of  monetary  policy. 
Moreover, if the disinflation and deflation are driven primarily by aggregate supply factors, 
this  suggests  that  the  recent  Chinese  macroeconomic  experience  stands  in  contrast  with 
Japan’s  deflation  induced  slump.
i  Deflation is associated with economic contraction. An 
alternative view suggests that productivity and technological changes lead to an expansion 
of  aggregate  supply  relative  to  aggregate  demand  thereby  leading  to  lower  prices  while   2
economic activity expands. Bernanke (2002), then a governor of the US Federal Reserve, 
remarked: “I don't know of any unambiguous example of a supply-side deflation, although 
China  in  recent  years  is  a  possible  case.”  Generally,  however,  most  observers  associate 
deflation with negative economic outcomes (Burdekin and Siklos 2004, Bordo and Filardo 
2004). 
One way to explore the forces driving inflation in China is to examine the relative 
importance of aggregate demand versus aggregate supply factors via the estimation of small 
order vector autoregressions (VARs). However, this paper departs from the usual approach 
by  comparing  results  from  the  application  of  three  sets  of  alternative  identification 
conditions, namely the standard Blanchard-Quah approach, an approach recently proposed 
by Cover, Enders, and Hueng (2006), as well as the set of identifying restrictions considered 
by Bordo, Landon-Lane and Redish (2004). The latter also use structural VARs to study 
economies  from  a  longer  run  historical  perspective.  Our  estimated  models  are  bivariate, 
consisting of real GDP and inflation, or trivariate, consisting of real GDP, inflation, and 
money or credit growth. Money or credit growth are used to proxy the direct effects of 
monetary policy since institutional considerations imply that an interest rate instrument is 
unsuitable in China’s case.  
Our  principal  finding  is  that  inflation  in  China  has  been  primarily  driven  by 
aggregate demand factors. Given that the People’s Bank of China (PBC) has a history of 
announcing monetary targets (generally in terms of an aggregate such as M2), our results are 
consistent with the view that monetary policy is central to understanding the behavior of 
inflation,  disinflation,  and  deflation  in  China.  While  aggregate  supply  factors  may  have 
pushed  inflation  low  enough  to  cross  the  threshold  into  deflation,  monetary  policy  is   3
primarily  responsible  for  Chinese  macroeconomic  outcomes.  More  importantly,  one  can 
only  interpret  China’s  deflation  as  being  supply-driven  if  AS  and  AD  disturbances  are 
assumed  to  be  uncorrelated,  an  assumption  implicit  in  the  oft-used  Blanchard-Quah 
decomposition, but one that is unappealing in China’s case. 
Lately, monetary aggregates have taken a back seat to interest rates in models used to 
evaluate monetary policy. Estimation of a Taylor rule would not be sensible in China’s case 
as the PBC does not have an interest rate target and several other key interest rates are 
largely  administratively  determined.  Fatas,  Mihov  and  Rose  (2007)  provide  evidence 
suggesting that central banks with a monetary target generate, on average, lower inflation. 
China’s experience adds additional evidence for the view that central banks which neglect 
monetary factors, in understanding the evolution of inflation do so at their own peril.  
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  First,  we  provide  an  overview  of  economic 
performance and the role of monetary policy in China. The econometric techniques used in 
the paper are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 provides a description of the data together 
with model estimates and their interpretation. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Inflation and Deflation in China: An Overview 
  Over  the  past  decade  or  more,  the  Chinese  economy  has consistently maintained 
rapid economic growth. The results are reflected in the rather remarkable levels of growth in 
both real GDP and industrial production, shown in Figure 2. While there is controversy 
about the accuracy of Chinese macroeconomic data (e.g., see Rawski 2002, Prasad 2004) 
few  would  disagree  that  overall  economic  growth  over  the  period  in  question  has  been 
impressive.  Annual  growth  rates  in  real  GDP  are  volatile.  However,  when  the  basis  of   4
comparison is an emerging market economy, China’s real GDP growth performance does 
not appear atypical. 
Figure 2 about here 
In the econometric analysis to follow, both output series were also converted into 
output gap type proxies, the usual practice in the relevant literature. A variety of filters, 
including cubic trends, HP filters and broken trends were examined. The series plotted in 
Figure 3 are representative of the various outcomes obtained. Broadly speaking, the type of 
filter does not seem to matter greatly except toward the end of the sample when the HP filter 
and cubic trends suggest that both real GDP and industrial production are below trend.
ii 
When the output gap is measured in terms of industrial production, economic activity is 
above trend toward the end of the sample. During the disinflation and deflation portions of 
the sample (1995 to 2004), the output gap based on industrial production is typically positive 
whereas the real GDP version is closer to trend much of the time.  
Figure 3 about here 
As recent monetary policy and exchange rate developments in China have been ably 
described elsewhere (e.g., Frankel and Wei 2007, Cargill and Parker 2004, Dai 2002) we 
simply point out that, over the sample considered, the PBC relied primarily on the control of 
monetary  aggregates,  less  so  on  an  interest  rate  instrument,  to  send  signals  about  its 
intentions.
iii Figure 4 plots narrow and broad money growth measures and the benchmark 
interest rate level in China since 1991. There is considerably more variation in the monetary 
aggregates than in interest rates over the sample considered while the money growth proxies 
reveal somewhat different time profiles. The summary statistics in Table 1 suggest a clear 
demarcation  in  economic  performance  between  the  eras  of  inflation  (1990-1994)  and   5
disinflation or deflation (1995-2004).
iv The data also suggest that economic growth slowed 
considerably  during  the  second  half  of  the  sample  considered.  Interestingly, the  average 
output gap based on industrial production is clearly positive during the inflation sample, and 
negative when only the disinflation and deflation data are considered. Almost two-thirds of 
the sample considered in this study consists of disinflation and deflation while over a third 
of the data cover a period of deflation, defined here as negative inflation.  
Figure 4 about here 
Table 1 about here 
The disinflation/deflation experience in China differs from that of Japan in that 
low inflation is accompanied by increasing output. The stable or slightly falling prices, 
low nominal interest rates and high valuation of domestic assets are largely supported by 
China’s strong long-term foreign direct investment inflows, abundant foreign currency 
liquidity and a favorable position of a net international creditor. However, large foreign 
capital inflows and the pegged exchange rate regime also feature potential high inflation, 
high local currency interest rates and lower asset prices in China. (see Icard 2003) 
China has been maintaining tight capital controls with a fixed exchange rate 
regime for years and the increasing revaluation expectations of the Chinese currency have 
triggered large capital inflows. Whether these expectations are justified remains 
controversial (e.g, see Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii 2007). As Prasad and Wei (2005) point 
out the vast majority of this inflows are in the form of FDI fueled by tax and other 
government incentives as well as by the resort to domestic Chinese firms forming joint 
ventures with foreign firms to avoid domestic lending and other administrative 
restrictions. With limited scope for Renminbi (RMB) exchange rate fluctuations (e.g., see   6
Frankel and Wei 2007), interest rates to differ from the US dollar rate and the fixed 
exchange rate, the price level in China becomes the residual (Liang 2003). In order to 
restrain recent inflationary pressures stemming from capital inflows, the PBC has been 
sterilizing foreign exchange intervention by selling bonds to domestic banks, and thereby 
reducing the amount of available liquidity in the market. The massive interventions on 
the foreign exchange market required to maintain the peg between the RMB and the US 
dollar imply a huge money supply growth in China (Ouyang, Rajan, and Willett 2007).  
In spite of the substantial sterilization of capital inflows, there is a sign that the 
PBC’s capacity has reached its limit. Accordingly, the PBC has lately raised interest rates 
or used alternative administrative measures to slow the growth of liquidity in the 
economy so as to curb inflationary pressures as observed since 2006. The PBC thus faces 
a dilemma since a more restrictive monetary policy, mainly an interest rate hike, could 
trigger financial problems for some state-owned enterprises that already have to cope 
with relatively high debt burden. As a result, there could be an increase in the level of 
non-performing loans (NPL) in the already fragile state-owned banking sector.
v The asset 
price inflation resulted from unchecked rapid credit growth further leads to deflationary 
pressure accompanied by more serious NPL problems in the banking sector and a 
possible reduction of economic growth.  
Yu (1997) outlines the background of China’s macroeconomic policy and assesses 
the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policy control in particular. He examines the long-
term  relationship  between  a  number  of  macroeconomic  variables  and  economic  activity 
from  1983:12-1994:05.  Employing  a  variety  of  vector  error-correction  models (VECMs) 
that  include  variables  such  as  money  aggregates,  bank  credit,  output  and  prices  in  the   7
empirical  estimation,  he  argues  that  tight  monetary  management  in  the  early  transition 
period  played  an  important  role  in  influencing  the  economic  cycle.  However,  monetary 
policy showed no significant impact on fixed-asset investment, retail sales to institutions and 
merchandise  imports.  The  reasons  are  that  the  highly  centralized  bank-credit  controlling 
system, the lack of independence of the central bank from government, showed up in the 
high  deposit  costs  and  huge non-performing loans  that are on the books of the banking 
sector.
vi  
Woo  (2003)  provides  an  overview  of  the  various  signals  of  macroeconomic 
“overheating” and deflation experienced during the economic transition to a more market-
driven economy. He argues that the roots of deflation pressure in China are the inadequate 
market-based  macroeconomic  reforms,  and  the  continued  unbalanced  credit  structure 
between  the  government  or  public  sector  vis-á-vis  the  domestic  private  sector. 
Consequently, existing savings are inefficiently intermediated through the monopoly state 
banks.  
Cargill and Parker (2004) is one of the few studies to have specifically examined 
China’s deflation. They argue that the recent deflation in China may have been supply-led. 
They interpret the high rates of real GDP growth, loose monetary and fiscal policies, and 
ongoing  structural  changes  in  the  economy  as  playing  important  roles  in  explaining  the 
deflation. As a result, China’s deflation was not harmful to the economy. They estimate a 
money demand function using quarterly data since 1960, and their empirical results show 
that the deflation had no measurable impact on money demand. Such a result is inconsistent 
with the People’s Bank of China’s (PBC) view that the recent aggressive monetary policy is   8
the key reason China has overcome the slowdown in the Asian economic zone, beginning 
with the Asian crisis of the late 1990s (also see Burdekin and Siklos 2007).  
3. Identifying Aggregate Demand and Supply Shocks in China 
The  Blanchard-Quah  (1989;  BQ)  approach  has  arguably  been  the  most  popular 
method used to examine the dynamic effects of economic innovations.
vii In a recent survey, 
Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2004) identified 13 of 27 empirical studies of emerging markets 
that relied on this approach to study business cycle correlations in Europe. Applications to 
China and other Asian economies are also plentiful (e.g., Zhang 2005). Nevertheless, all 
such  applications  have  focused  on  output  developments  while  the  primary  focus  of  this 
paper is on the course of inflation in China since 1990. The technique consists in estimating 
a  VAR  system  that  includes  at  least  two  endogenous  variables,  imposes  the  necessary 
restrictions  to  identify  two  types  of  disturbances  that  are  then  interpreted  as  aggregate 
demand and aggregate supply shocks. By imposing different identification restrictions, the 
permanent or temporary effects of these two shocks and their economic interpretation can be 
estimated.  Other  research  has  extended  BQ  methodology to examine the contribution of 
either type of shock by employing a different set of restrictions.  
The normalization restrictions in Cover, Enders and Hueng (2006) differ from BQ’s 
methodology  in  important  ways.  They  argue  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  assume  that  the 
structural shocks are mutually uncorrelated. Instead, aggregate demand and supply are seen 
as moving together through time. The impact of supply shocks on output will then depend 
on the relationship between aggregate demand and supply shifts.  
The  bivariate  approach  is,  arguably,  a  restrictive  one.  For  example,  Bordo  and 
Redish (2004), using annual data, estimate aggregate supply, monetary policy and aggregate   9
demand shocks, and impose three different sets of restrictions to identify these. In this paper 
we adopt a similar methodology to theirs to explore the Chinese inflationary experience 
(also see Bordo, Landon-Lane and Redish 2004). 
3.1 Identification methodology I: The Benchmark BQ model  
Two types of disturbances affect output and inflation. Aggregate supply disturbances 
have a long run effect on either inflation and or output. Aggregate demand disturbances are 
assumed to have no long run effect on inflation, but may have a long run effect on output. 
Finally, these two disturbances are uncorrelated at all leads and lags. To derive the joint 
process,  we  let  DP  and  DY,  respectively,  denote  price  and  output  level  that  have  been 
differenced in the log levels once to achieve stationarity.
viii The resulting bivariate VAR is 
written:  
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where  pt e  and  yt e  are the random disturbances in the price and output level equations and 
they reflect a linear combination of the underlying structural shocks that are responsible for 
variations in  t P  and  t Y .  Following earlier studies, one of these structural shocks is assumed 
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Following the BQ methodology, the first three restrictions are on the four elements of A (0), 
where for any matrix A (0) such that A (0) A (0)’= W. Since the two disturbances,  pt e  and   10
yt e ,  are  assumed  to  be  uncorrelated  in  the  standard  BQ  model,  the  variance covariance 
matrix is diagonal and covariance matrix is identity. Therefore, we can write: 
2
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According to the above description, the restriction
2
s e s =
2
d e s =1 ensures that the variance of 
the demand and supply shocks are equal, while the condition 
s d e e s =0 implies that the two 
types of shocks are uncorrelated. Finally, the restriction 12 0 ( ) 0
j a j
¥
= = ∑ means that demand 
shocks,  d e , have no permanent effect on output. 
3.2 Identification methodology II: Modified BQ Model 
The assumption that demand and supply shocks are uncorrelated is implausible for 
the  Chinese  case  because  the  monetary  and  fiscal  authorities  acted in  tandem  in  setting 
national  targets  for  economic  growth.  A  methodology  proposed  by  Cover,  Enders  and 
Hueng (2006) relaxes such restriction that AD and AS shocks are uncorrelated. Instead, they 
specify  short-run  restrictions  implied  by  an  aggregate  demand  and  supply  model  which, 
when combined with the BQ restrictions, permits the structural shocks to be correlated.  
These restrictions cannot be accommodated in the Benchmark BQ model. Therefore, 
the responses of output and the price level need to be re-estimated, allowing the disturbances 
to be correlated. Let  t Y  and t P  denote the logarithm of output and the logarithm of price level 
respectively during period t, while  1 t t Y -  and  1 t t P - represent the level of expected output and 
price level given the information at the end of period t. A simple AD-AS model can be 
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As identified in the benchmark BQ model,  s e  is the aggregate supply shock and  d e  
is the aggregate demand shock. However, the relationship between these shocks is no longer 
assumed to be uncorrelated. Therefore,  0 ¹ s e e d s  and there is one less restriction than in 
the BQ decomposition. Two alternatives for the short-run restrictions are possible. We can 
assume that an AS shock has an immediate impact on AD shocks in the following manner: 
0 d s d e be e = +            (5) 
where  d e is the linear combination of pure AD shocks 
0 d e and the induced change from the 
AS shocks is s be ; b  is the weight of temporary AS shocks that can result in a contemporary 
change  in  aggregate  demand.  Covers,  Enders,  and  Hueng  (2006),  show  that  the  BQ 
decomposition amounts to assuming that a shift in AS leads to a shift in AD. A plausible 
scenario is one where the monetary authorities believe there has been an aggregate supply 
shock, and they react to it within the same quarter. Hence, AD shocks are seen to be a 
response to shocks that originate from the AS side of the economy. The reaction need not, of 
course, be such that 1 b = . As noted earlier, some observers of the Chinese economy argue 
that short-run causality has effectively run from the AS to the AD side of the economy.  
A second possibility is that the short-run link runs from AD shocks to AS shocks in 
which case the relationship is written: 
0 s d s e ge e = +             (6) 
For example, the parameterg  can depend on the degree of price rigidity in the economy. 
Firms do not fully adjust price in response to some unexpected demands shock and continue   12
to oversupply the output demanded. There is a good case to be made that China’s policies 
are  consistent  with  this  possibility as  well.  After  all, China is not a full-fledged market 
economy, and there is substantial government involvement in the economy in the form of 
aggressive  aggregate  demand  management.  Consequently,  any  mistakes  in  the 
implementation of monetary policy in China could give rise to the relationship embodied in 
equation  (6).  Additionally,  the  well  documented  problems  with  the  banking  sector, 
dominated by state-owned banks and, consequently, strongly influenced by PBC policies, 
may also contribute to a short-run link going from AD to AS. 
As in the BQ model, it is still assumed that structural demand and supply shocks are 
orthogonal in this bivariate VAR system. However, the variances of AD and AS shocks are 
no  longer  restricted to unity. Therefore, the estimation of the VAR yields the following 
variance-covariance representation: 
2 2
11 12 11 21
2 2
21 22 12 22
1 1 1
var( ) cov( ) 1 1 1 1
cov( ) var( ) 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
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  (7) 
where 
2
s e s is the variance of the structural supply shock and 
0
2
d e s is the variance of pure AD 
shocks, which is independent of AS shocks.  
Following  Cover,  Enders  and  Hueng  (2006),  three  independent  restrictions  are 
imposed.  They  are:  11 c =a 12 c ,  11 c = 21 c -  and  11 c = 22 c , as well as the long run neutrality 
restriction that AD shocks have no long run impact in output. The structural parameters 
obtained  from  such  restrictions  will  be  used  to  explain  the  slope  of  aggregate  supply   13









3.3 Identification methodology III: Separate Identification of Monetary Policy 
Shocks 
A potential drawback with the methodologies discussed above is that they do not 
permit the separate identification of monetary policy shocks. Hence, we also consider the 
joint behavior of the price, output and money stock. Let  P D  again denote inflation,  Y D  the 
growth of real GDP, and  M D is growth in the money stock. Three stochastic disturbances 
are  estimated,  namely  a  money  supply  shock,  ms e ,  an  aggregate  supply  shock,  s e and 
demand shock,  d e . Next, we impose long-run restrictions on the impact of the shocks on 
prices and output. The resulting VAR consists of prices, output and money stock and is 
written as follows: 
1
p
t t j t j t
j
y D B y a e -
=
D = + D + ∑         (8) 
  where  t y = , ( , ) t t t PY M ¢and  t D is  a  matrix  of  deterministic  variables.  Following  the  BQ 
approach,  a  set  of  structural  innovations,  t u ,  that  are  orthogonal  to  each  other  can  be 
obtained from this reduced VAR specification from: 
t t Cu e =           (9) 
We identify C by imposing three alternative long-run restrictions on the structural 
impulse response functions implied by the reduced form VAR to examine the impact of each 
shock that drives the joint behavior of prices, output and the money stock.    14
   A first set of restrictions assumes that an aggregate demand shock is the sum of 
money demand shocks and temporary spending shocks that have a zero long-run impact on 
output and prices. The money supply shock is defined to be non-neutral, implying that a 
positive monetary shock will increase output in the long run. Fluctuations in the price level 
are attributed to the change in money supply shocks but the temporary or permanent impact 
of these shocks on price, output, and the money stock, is not restricted. Aggregate supply 
shocks are expected to lower the price level and increase the output in the short run but a 
rise in aggregate demand will then raise the price level until it returns to its original level. 
Therefore, assuming the structural innovation vector is ordered as  ( , , ) t ms s d u e e e ¢ =  ,  the 
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       (10) 
Under this series of restrictions, aggregate supply shocks have no long-run impact on 
the price level. As previously discussed, this is not a view shared by most observers of 
Chinese economic developments during the 1990s. Since there are three zero restrictions the 
system is exactly identified. 
   Another  long-run  restriction  consists  in  assuming  that  money  is  neutral,  which 
implies that the long-run impact of a money supply shock on output is zero. In other words, 
AD shocks are neutral. Those who favor the view of a PBC that ‘did no harm’ to inflation 
would  prefer  this  set  of  restrictions.  Alternatively,  if  the  PBC,  and  AD  policies  more 
generally, were important factors in China’s inflation rate then the following restrictions 
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       (11) 
In this case there are four zero restrictions and this implies that the system is over identified. 
Consequently,  we  can  test  whether  the  hypothesis  of  monetary  neutrality  describes  the 
Chinese experience.  
   Finally, we also consider the case where aggregate supply shocks are permitted to 
have a long-run impact on inflation while monetary neutrality is maintained. This is the case 
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       (12) 
This system is also exactly identified. 
  If (11) is rejected then we are unable to formally discriminate between (10) and (12). 
In the case of (10) inflation would be interpreted as a monetary phenomenon, while in the 
case of (12) the results are consistent with a supply-side induced inflation. Therefore, in 
order to discriminate between the two hypotheses we also estimate the relevant VARs for a 
sub-sample beginning in 1995 when the behavior of inflation clearly changes (see Figure 1). 
If the results are similar across the two sub-samples then there is little evidence that the 
episodes of disinflation and deflation were driven by different shocks than ones explaining 
the period of rising inflation.   
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Data   16
All models are estimated with quarterly data over the period 1990:1 to 2003:3. The 
data are collected from National Bureau of Statistics (NBS, formerly known as the State 
Statistics Bureau), the China Statistical Yearbook, the People’s Bank of China website, and 
the  International  Financial  Statistics  CD-ROM.  Because  the  statistical  administration  in 
China is still developing, only nominal GDP
ix was available on a quarterly series while CPI 
did not become an official economic indicator until 2000. No CPI index is published. Only a 
measure  of  inflation,  in  percent  at  annual  rates,  is  available. Therefore,  real  output  was 
estimated by deriving a price index from published inflation figures and dividing nominal 
GDP by the resulting price index. The year 1989 was taken as the base year.
 x Additional 
seasonal adjustment is performed to remove seasonality in real GDP levels and price index.
xi 
Next,  the  log  first difference of  the  estimated  quarterly real  GDP  figure  is  evaluated  to 
obtain output growth. In addition, several proxies for the output gap, described earlier, are 
also considered. To investigate the sensitivity of our results, we repeat all our estimations 
using industrial production. The money stock is measured either as narrow money or Quasi-
money, using the IMF definitions.  
4.2 Estimates of Structural Shocks 
  Figures 5a and 5b plot the impulse response functions (IRFs) based on the standard BQ 
decomposition. Both full sample (top two figures; 1990-2003) and sub-sample (bottom two 
figures; 1995-2003) results are shown.
xii In the case of inflation AS shocks elicit the largest 
response  in  the  full  sample  while  AD  shocks  produce  larger  responses  in  the 
disinflation/deflation sample. Turning to the impact of AD and AS shocks on output we find 
that whereas AD shocks temporarily reduce real GDP growth in either sample, AS shocks 
have  a  positive,  albeit  temporary  impact  on  growth,  again  in  both  samples  considered.   17
Clearly,  the  response  of  inflation  is  sensitive  to  the chosen  sample  while  the impact  of 
shocks on output growth is less sample sensitive. Figure 5b shows that the impact of AD and 
AS shocks is also sensitive to the choice of our measure of output. When a proxy for the gap 
in industrial production is used we now find that AD shocks generate a relatively larger 
inflationary response. However, in this case, the result is not sample sensitive. In the case of 
output responses to AD and AS shocks, both types of shocks produce positive, but only 
temporary, responses on industrial production with AS shocks producing the largest impulse 
responses of the two. While the results are clearly mixed there is considerable scope for 
interpreting China’s inflation and output as possibly being primarily being driven by AD 
shocks. 
Figure 5 about here 
  The IRFs in the case where short-run restrictions specified in equation (5) are imposed 
are shown in Figure 6. We note that the IRFs are no longer sensitive to the definition of 
output. In particular, AD shocks produce the biggest inflationary response in both samples 
and for both output definitions. In the case of IRFs for output, output responds positively, 
but temporarily, to AD and AS shocks. To the extent that consistency across output proxies 
makes for a more robust set of results, this suggests that inflation in China responds to AD 
shocks and not exclusively to AS shocks.  
Figure 6 about here 
  Figure 7 provides IRFs for the trivariate VAR. Since the results for the 1995-2003 sub-
sample are similar to ones obtained for the full sample (not shown), only the full sample 
estimates are presented. As discussed previously, the restriction that AD shocks have no 
long-run effects, produces an over-identified model (see (11)). The validity of this restriction   18
can  therefore  be  tested.  The  likelihood  ratio  test  statistic  is  found  to  be  27.93  (.00). 
Consequently, the null is soundly rejected. IRFs are shown in the middle portion of Figure 7 
for completeness but are not discussed further. This leaves two alternatives, namely, either 
AS  shocks  are  neutral  (top  portion  of  Figure  7),  or  monetary  policy  shocks  are  neutral 
(bottom portion of Figure 7) while AS shocks are unconstrained in the long run. When AS 
shocks  have  no  long-run  impact  on  inflation  (top  portion  of  the  Figure)  money  supply 
shocks elicit a positive inflationary response while AD and AS shocks lead to a negative 
response. Moreover, money growth responds strongly to monetary policy shocks and to AD 
shocks but not to AS shocks. Finally, output growth responds positively to monetary policy 
shocks while AS shocks generate a temporary but positive response on real GDP growth.  
  The  situation  is rather  different  when AS shocks are not restricted in the long-run 
while money supply shocks are neutral in the long-run, as shown in the bottom portion of 
Figure 7. Inflation now elicits a positive response from AS shocks more so than from money 
supply shocks, while AD shocks lead to a negative response in inflation. Similarly, money 
supply shocks generate a temporary negative impact on output growth, as do AD shocks, 
while  AS  shocks  generate  a  positive  output  growth  response.  Finally,  monetary  policy 
responds positively to all sources of shocks but especially to AS shocks. 
  Taken  together  the  case  depicted  in  the  top portion  of  Figure  7,  or  the  alternative 
identification strategy suggested by Cover, Enders and Hueng (see Figure 6) appear to be the 
most plausible candidates to explain the sources of shocks driving inflation in particular in 
China. Finally, as shown in Table 2, additional tests reveal that variables such as inflation in 
commodity prices are exogenous. Consequently, the addition of such variables did not affect 
the impulse responses shown in Figure 7. The same is generally true for export growth and   19
for the growth in the nominal effective exchange rates, although one is able to reject the null 
that the exchange rate is exogenous in the inflation equation. Yet, the IRFs (not shown) are 
largely unaffected.  
Figure 7 about here 
Table 2 about here 
  While  impulse  responses  are  useful,  variance  decompositions  (VD)  can  help  us 
determine  the  relative  importance of  shocks.  Tables 3a and 3b present VDs for the full 
sample case only rely on the BQ and Cover, Enders and Hueng methodologies. Table 3a is 
the case for the standard AD-AS model (with the direction of short-run causality running 
from AS to AD shocks), while Table 3b provides the case where the short-run restriction 
defined  by  equation  (6)  is  imposed.  In  the  BQ  decomposition,  output  growth  is  largely 
explained  by  AS  shocks,  although  AD  shocks  also  play  an  important  role.  Turning  to 
inflation, it is overwhelmingly explained by AS shocks.  
  Consider next the alternative specification proposed by Cover, Enders and Hueng. AD 
shocks  now  explain  almost  all  of  the  variation  in  output  growth.  Under  this  scenario, 
independent AS shocks cannot explain Chinese output growth. In the case of inflation, AS 
shocks also explain much of the variation in inflation in the short-term. However, at longer 
horizons, AD shocks become increasingly important. The point estimates of the correlation 
between  AD  and  AS  shocks  is  0.45,  implying  that both AD and AS  shocks are  indeed 
positively correlated,  as hypothesized earlier.
xiii Tables 4a and 4b show the VDs for the 
trivariate VARs.
xiv Since we reject the case where AS shocks have no long-run impact on 
output or inflation, these VDs are not shown. Regardless whether AS shocks are restricted to 
have  no  long-run  impact  on  inflation,  money  supply  shocks  overwhelmingly  explain   20
inflation, as well as a large fraction of output growth. AS shocks, however, are important 
determinants of output growth in the case of either scenarios hypothesized in (10) or (12) but 
also play an relatively minor role in determining inflation.   
Tables 3 and 4 about here 
  5. Conclusions  
  In light of the recent debate over the role of monetary policy and aggregate supply 
factors in explaining the recent Chinese inflationary experience, this paper asks whether the 
monetary  transmission  process  of  a  highly  centralized  economy  such  as  China’s  can 
adequately be described by estimating structural VARs. For this purpose, different models 
were estimated using Chinese data for the period from 1990 to 2004, together with a sub-
sample running from 1995-2003. The structural shocks were identified by a mixture of long 
run and short-run restrictions, following the Blanchard-Quah decomposition methodology, 
and two variants of this approach. 
  Money supply shocks largely explain inflation while aggregate supply shocks play a 
secondary role. Therefore, our results do not support the “supply-driven” view of China’s 
deflation in  particular.  One can  only  conclude  that  the  Chinese deflation  was driven by 
aggregate supply factors if it is assumed that AS and AD shocks are uncorrelated, and this 
appears highly unlikely in the Chinese case.  
  The results also reveal how China was able to escape deflation. An aggressive 
loosening of monetary policy permitted the end of deflation. However, the results also point 
to a role for AS factors. Nevertheless, since it is difficult to precisely identify the sources of 
AS shocks, the PBC should not automatically rely on future productivity improvements to   21
prevent an excessively loose monetary policy from producing once again excessively high 
inflation.  
   22
Table 1.  Summary Statistics for the Chinese Economy, 1990-2003 
 
  Full sample  Inflation only  Disinflation-Deflation only 
Real GDP  8.86  11.34  7.74 
Industrial Production  14.82  22.03  12.10 
Inflation  5.68  10.34  3.02 
Output Gap 
(Real GDP)  -  -0.004  0.002 
Output Gap 
(Industrial Production) -  0.82  -0.317 
 
 
Note: See appendix and Figures 1 to 3 for additional details. The output gap figures are 
based on the HP filtered measures of the output gap. The disinflation-deflation sample 
consists of data for the 1995-2003 periods only.    23
Table 2.  Tests of Exogeneity  
 












Inflation  .75 (.86)  3.55 (.31)  2.74 (.43)  8.97 (.03) 
Real GDP growth  .96 (.81)  4.40 (.22)  4.49 (.21)  3.42 (.33) 
Money Supply growth  2.67 (.44)  1.35 (.72)  10.38 (.02) 5.90 (.18) 
 
 
Note: Based on the three variable VAR described in the test estimated over the full sample. 
The test statistic is the c
2 test for block exogeneity with p-values given in parenthesis.  
.   24
  
Table 3. Variance Decompositions: Full Sample, Bivariate VAR 
 
 
a. Standard or BQ Decomposition AD-AS Model (AS causes AD) 
 
  Output Growth  Inflation 
Horizon  Due to AS  Due to AD  Due to AS  Due to AD 
1.000  0.524  0.476  0.761  0.239 
2.000  0.507  0.493  0.790  0.210 
3.000  0.535  0.465  0.788  0.212 
4.000  0.654  0.346  0.800  0.200 
5.000  0.613  0.387  0.827  0.173 
6.000  0.585  0.415  0.818  0.182 
7.000  0.585  0.415  0.826  0.174 
8.000  0.597  0.403  0.829  0.171 
9.000  0.595  0.405  0.832  0.168 
10.000  0.596  0.404  0.832  0.168 
11.000  0.597  0.403  0.833  0.167 
b. AD-AS Model (AD causes AS) or Cover, Enders, and Hueng Variation 
Horizon  Due to AS  Due to AD  Due to AS  Due to AD 
1.000  0.025  0.975  0.804  0.196 
2.000  0.031  0.969  0.772  0.228 
3.000  0.103  0.897  0.776  0.224 
4.000  0.283  0.717  0.763  0.237 
5.000  0.361  0.639  0.727  0.273 
6.000  0.373  0.627  0.737  0.263 
7.000  0.373  0.627  0.728  0.272 
8.000  0.358  0.642  0.726  0.274 
9.000  0.356  0.644  0.721  0.279 
10.000  0.358  0.642  0.721  0.279 
11.000  0.369  0.631  0.720  0.280 
         
Notes: Output growth is the real GDP. Inflation is the rate of change in CPI. See Figures 
1 and 2. Multiply by 100 to convert into percent.   25
Table 4a Variance Decompositions: Three-Variable VAR 
 
 
 Variance Decomposition of Inflation (%) 





    Source of Shocks 
 1   0.938   100.0   0.000   0.000 
 2   1.431   97.70   1.135   1.162 
 3   1.913   98.62   0.709   0.666 
 4   2.285   98.95   0.522   0.529 
 5   2.496   98.84   0.714   0.444 
 6   2.658   98.53   1.045   0.425 
 7   2.747   98.01   1.593   0.401 
 8   2.816   97.37   2.228   0.399 
 9   2.859   97.14   2.455   0.400 
 10   2.891   96.95   2.639   0.411 
 11   2.919   96.91   2.679   0.415 
 Variance Decomposition of Real GDP Growth (%) 





    Source of Shocks 
 1   5.734   4.427   95.57   0.000 
 2   5.850   4.270   95.43   0.300 
 3   6.471   21.74   78.02   0.246 
 4   7.002   30.88   68.46   0.661 
 5   7.107   30.18   67.32   2.500 
 6   7.189   30.64   65.80   3.560 
 7   7.253   31.28   65.20   3.520 
 8   7.262   31.22   65.11   3.673 
 9   7.318   32.02   64.11   3.868 
 10   7.322   32.00   64.08   3.923 
 11   7.333   32.04   64.05   3.912 
 
Note: Restrictions imposed as in (10).  26
Table 4b Variance Decompositions: Three-Variable VAR 
 
 
 Variance Decomposition of Inflation (%) 





    Source of Shocks 
 1   0.938   95.57   4.427   0.000 
 2   1.431   96.67   2.168   1.162 
 3   1.913   96.85   2.486   0.666 
 4   2.285   96.74   2.731   0.529 
 5   2.496   95.44   4.121   0.444 
 6   2.658   94.15   5.430   0.425 
 7   2.747   92.90   6.699   0.401 
 8   2.816   91.66   7.944   0.399 
 9   2.859   91.13   8.468   0.400 
 10   2.891   90.71   8.877   0.411 
 11   2.919   90.54   9.041   0.415 
 Variance Decomposition of Real GDP Growth (%) 





    Source of Shocks 
 1   5.734   0.000   100.0   0.000 
 2   5.850   0.073   99.63   0.300 
 3   6.471   17.35   82.40   0.246 
 4   7.002   24.72   74.62   0.661 
 5   7.107   24.06   73.44   2.500 
 6   7.189   24.54   71.90   3.560 
 7   7.253   25.58   70.90   3.520 
 8   7.262   25.56   70.77   3.673 
 9   7.318   26.41   69.72   3.868 
 10   7.322   26.41   69.67   3.923 
 11   7.333   26.41   69.68   3.912 
 




















































Inflation in the U nited States, 1960-2002
 
 
Note: Inflation in China is the log change in the CPI. See the appendix. Inflation in the US 
is the annual rate of change (fourth order log difference) in the US CPI. Data from FRED II 
(research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/).  
Figure 1  Comparing China’s and the US’s Inflation Rate  28





































Note: Real GDP growth is the annual rate of change in the seasonally adjusted real GDP 
(fourth order log difference). Seasonal adjustment was obtained using X11 (additive 
method). Industrial production growth is from the IFS CD-ROM (IMF: Washington, D.C.).   29





































Note: The output gap is log of real GDP or Industrial Production less the HP filtered value 
(with smoothing parameter shown above) or from the fitted values of either a quadratic or a 
cubic trend fitted to the log levels of either series.    30




















































The PBC's benchmark interest rate, 1991-2003
 
 
   
Note: For data sources, see the appendix. Annual growth rates for narrow and broad 
money are plotted.  
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BQ Decomposition: Full Sample, 1990-2003




Note: For estimation details, see text.   32
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BQ Decomposition: Full Sample, 1990-2003
BQ Decomposition: Sub-sample, 1995-2003
 
 
Note: For estimation details see text.   33
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BQ Decomposition Using Alternative Identification Strategy
Full Sample, 1990-2003




Note: For estimation details, see text. 
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s  h  o  c  k 
R  e  s  p  o  n  s  e     o  f     I  n  d  u  s  t  r  i  a  l     P  r  o  d  u  c  t  i  o  n 
t  o     S  t  r  u  c  t  u  r  a  l     O  n  e     S  .  D  .     I  n  n  o  v  a  t  i  o  n  s 
B  Q    D  e  c  o  m  p  o  s  i  t  i  o  n    U  s  i  n  g    A  l  t  e  r  n  a  t  i  v  e    I  d  e  n  t  i  f  i  c  a  t  i  o  n    S  t  r  a  t  e  g  y 
F  u  l  l    S  a  m  p  l  e  ,    1  9  9  0  -  2  0  0  3 
B  Q    D  e  c  o  m  p  o  s  i  t  i  o  n    U  s  i  n  g    A  l  t  e  r  n  a  t  i  v  e    I  d  e  n  t  i  f  i  c  a  t  i  o  n   S  t  r  a  t  e  g  y 
S  u  b  -  s  a  m  p  l  e  ,    1  9  9  5  -  2  0  0  3 
 
 
Note: For estimation details, see text. 
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Note: For estimation details, see text. The top portion of the Figure imposes the 
restrictions found in (10), the middle figure relies on the restrictions in (11), while the 
restrictions in (11) are used to generate the results in the bottom portion of the figure.  36
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Appendix 
 
CPI calculation: Before 2000, there was no economic indicator of Consumer Price Index in 
China and the available official index for price level measure from 1985 to 2000 is annual or 
monthly change of consumer price. Year 2000 was made as the base period of the first round 
of compile fix-based monthly price index (Year 2000=100).  
(1)  Grouping of CPI. The consumer price index in China consists of 8 major categories: 
food,  alcoholic  beverages  and  tobacco  products,  clothing,  household  equipment  and  service, 
health  and  personal  care,  transportation  and  communication,  entertainment,  education  and 
culture, shelter, etc.  
(2)  Selection of representative items. In the previous series, 289 kinds of goods and 36 kings 
of services have been selected for China’s CPI. The current CPI is based on a basket comprised 
of 500-600 goods and services, which are aggregated into 282 subgroup, then into 80 groups and 
finally into 8 sections. Those goods and services were guided by certain criteria and based on the 
accounting material of about 30,000 urban households and 60,000 rural households. 
(3)  Selection of surveying area and outlets. There are about citied and countries used for 
China CPI survey up to now. In each area, shops (including country fairs and service sites)are 
selected based on their sales volume and abundance of goods, and they must be representative of 
price trends. There are nearly 10000 outlets included in China CPI.  
(4)  Price collection. Prices are collected directly by professional staff at certain time and 
outlets, which are: (a) Those actually paid by purchasers rather than the amounts listed in the 
counter. (b) Items have close relation to people’s life and their prices change frequently are 
priced at least every five days; Others are collected 2-3 times each month; where prices are 
controlled  by  government  or  price  movement  are  relatively  stable,  information  is  collected 
monthly or quarterly. 
(5)  Source of the weights. The weights of CPI are calculated according to the expenditure 
structure  in  household  survey  annually,  while  weights  for  fresh  vegetables  and  foods  are 
adjusted monthly.  
(6)  Release of the Index. Index is released through monthly economic reports of NBS on 
12
th of following month and quarterly news release conference of NBS.  
 
GDP calculation: GDP in China is the sum of the gross value added by all resident producers in 
the economy plus any taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It   2
is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and 
degradation of natural resources. Transfer payments are excluded from the calculation of GDP. 
Value  added  is  the  net  output  of  an  industry  after  adding  up  all  outputs  and  subtracting 
intermediate  inputs.  The  industrial  origin  of  value  added  is  determined  by  the  International 
Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) revision. 
 
Data source description:  NBS is the abbreviation of National Bureau of Statistics of China. Its 
responsibility  include:  Drafting  and  implementing  statistics  and  regulations;  Overseeing 
statistical and national accounting activities of local governments and ministries. Improving the 
systems  of  national  accounts  and  statistical  indicators;  formulating  the  national  statistical 
standards; Collecting national statistics and conducting statistical analysis of economic, social, 
and technological development; Improving the automated statistical information system and the 
national statistical database. 
It was set up in 1952 and until March 1999 the NBS launched the China Statistical 
Information Network (www.stats.gov.cn), an online resource that makes information from NBS 
databases available to a wider audience, including detailed statistics on economic and social 
development, information from various censuses and the NBS’s monthly statistics on national 
economic  performance.  The  statistical  data  before  1999  is  only  available  from  the  annual 
publication of NBS, the China Statistical Yearbook. 
 
China  Statistical  Yearbook:    It  is  an  annual  statistics  publication,  which  covers  very 
comprehensive data in every year and some selected data series in historically important years 
and the most recent twenty years at national level and local levels of province, autonomous 
region,  and  municipalities  directly  under  control  of  the  central  government  and  therefore, 
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*  Earlier  versions  were  presented  at  an  invited  session  of the  Hong  Kong  Economic 
Association/Western  Economic  Association  International  Conference,  Hong  Kong,  the 
Bank of Finland, the WEAI conference in San Diego, and the Hong Kong Institute of 
Monetary  Research.  Comments  on  a  previous  draft  by  King  Banaian,  Andy  Filardo, 
Elliott Parker and the Editor, are gratefully acknowledged, as is the GAUSS program 
from Walt Enders used in Cover, Enders and Hueng (2006) 
i There is, of course, a vast literature on the Japanese experience with deflation. A partial 
list would include, for example, Hutchison (2004), Kuttner and Posen (2004), Okina and 
Shiratsuka (2004), Hetzel (1999), and Krugman (1998). 
ii A well-known problem with the HP filter is its sensitivity to the end-points of the 
sample. See, for example, Dupasquier, Guay and St.-Amant (1999). 
iii See, for example, www.pbc.gov.cn/english/huobizhengce/instruments.asp, and 
People’s Bank of China (2003, 2004).  
iv Negative inflation rates were actually recorded in 1998-99 and 2001-02. However, even 
when positive inflation rates were recorded in 2000 and 2001, these were well below 1% 
(except in 2001Q2 when the inflation rate was 1.10%). Hence, it is not inaccurate to state 
that China experienced deflation during the 1998-2002 period.   
v Chinese state-owned banks are the most important player of the Chinese financial 
system. In 2004, bank loans represented 83 percent of the funds raised by the non-
financial sector, while stocks were only 5 percent and bonds 12 percent (11 percent for 
government bonds and 1 percent corporate ones). As the main financier of non-profitable 
state-owned  enterprises (SOEs), state-owned banks' performance have a direct impact on   4
                                                                                                                                                 
SOEs and systemic consequences on the economy. See, for example, García-Herrero, 
Gavilá and Santabárbara (2006). 
vi Reforms of the Chinese banking sector has not brought sizeable benefits so far except 
for improving asset quality, and doubts remain about a possible build-up of new NPLs by 
low profitable state-owned banks given the fast credit growth and overheating in real 
estate recently. 
vii See, for example, a simulated out-of-sample forecasting study for Finnish CPI inflation 
by Billmeier (2004). Cheung and Yuen (2004) also use BQ approach to assess the level 
of integration of the three Greater China economies (China, Hong Kong and Taiwan) and 
examines the suitability of a Greater China currency union. A variant of the BQ 
technique is also applied on evaluating the high-yield spread as a predictor of real 
economic activity in supportive of the financial accelerator mechanism for the U.S. See 
Mody and Taylor (2003).  
viii In the case of output an alternative that is often preferred is to use a proxy for the 
output gap. This approach is also followed below. 
ix Estimates of GDP are made independently from the production side (sum of value 
added)  and  the  expenditure  side  (sum  of  final  expenditures).  Different  estimates  are 
obtained by the two methods. The NBS considers that its estimates from the production 
side are more reliable and the statistical discrepancy is therefore shown in the estimates 
of GDP from the expenditure side. The quarterly estimates of GDP from the production 
side distinguish 13 separate activities for the tertiary sector, but there is no breakdown of 
the primary sector (agriculture, animal husbandry, forestry and fishing) and the secondary 
sector is broken down into only "industry" and "construction". The discrepancies are not   5
                                                                                                                                                 
large and are about 1% of GDP on average. Quarterly GDP data are provided in Press 
Releases issued at regular press conferences held in April, July, October and January 
 (Chinese).  Source:  IMF,  general  data  dissemination  system  site,  data  category  and 
indicators  of  China,  from 
http://dsbb.imf.org/Applications/web/gdds/gddscountrycategorydcreport/?strcode=CHN
&strcat=NGDP0.  
x The official year-to-year change of consumer price is available from 1990 only. 
xi The ARIMA X-12 (additive) procedure was used to obtain seasonally adjusted 
estimates.  
xii It has been suggested to us that splitting the sample around 1997, to account for the 
Asian crisis, might be preferable. Doing so, however, would leave too few usable 
observations to perform the kind of econometrc testing envisaged here. Nevertheless, as 
our full and sub-sample estimates both confirm the central role played by monetary 
factors we can only presume that this result would also hold for a sub-sample since the 
Asian crisis (also see Burdekin and Siklos 2007).  
xiii The estimate is slightly lower than the point estimate of 0.64 reported in Cover, Enders 
and Hueng (2006). Given the short span of the sample, one cannot claim that these point 
estimates are precisely estimated.  
xiv To conserve space, the VDs for money growth are not shown but are available on 
request. 